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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The subject matter of this appeal is that of domestic 
relations relative to child support and visitation. 
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of this appeal is 
vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(h) which states: 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(h)appeals from district court involving 
domestic relations cases, including but not 
limited to divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On September 18, 1985 Blanca H. Charlesworth and the 
State of California submitted to the Department of Social 
Services a petition to obtain an obligation of support against 
Laurian P. Charlesworth pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal 
Enforcement of Support Act, (hereinafter referred to as "URESA"). 
At a hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner for Weber 
County the payment of child support by Mr. Charlesworth was 
conditioned upon his being able to visit with the minor children. 
He was ordered to pay $76.00 per month per child, said payments 
were to be made to and held by the Weber County Clerk Office. 
Counsel for defendants requested a review by the district court. 
The district court upon review affirmed the order of the Domestic 
Relations Commissioner. Counsel for plaintiff's then filed their 
Notice of Appeal to this forum. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the District Court has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate visitation privileges in a proceeding under the 
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
2. Whether the payment of child support can be 
terminated or withheld as a result of the noncustodial parent 
being unable to exercise his rights of visitation. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Decree of Divorce was entered in WH'MM County, Lit ah 
'UiL|Lii-.i i " ,„ !'MM( MI, 'i between the plaintiff Laurian P. 
Charleswortr and Blanca H Charlesworth. n the decree the 
defendant w- *• awarded > • 1 \ 1 1 « l i i , -1 m I « I I < I 
suppe .is :. ,. i T" abeyance because or. lacx oil an appearance by 
the defendant :. Late ^r Caliform i ^ *<a Blanca H 
Charlesworth > • part merit ot Social 
Services +-n ^JLCILJ. . su a.-a enforce - obligation of support 
against Lr Charleswort r through * •<•? 'r, ;f 'Tin Reciprocal 
Enforcement - - -„•<•• * ">t Social ...erv.ces 
for the r;ati -.-i *Lan servec ^ Petition rcr Support and Order to 
Show Cause upon Wr Charlesworth under and pursuant 
Uniform Keciproi itorcument ot Support Act ., ' 31-1 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. A hearing was held before the 
Honorable Maurice u'i^harn .-otn^ s' • l,vl,it "'ins ' nuiii Sb 11. i ci lur. 
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 IP .Second .hi* . • i ;. . :strict C o m This Commissioner entered an 
ongoing order ;i :.ild support - : ordered that the Court Clerk 
pot forward any paynu
 :: i i „n ii'swun n .uiv-jiui if 
(•At- -: Z.K: . :..;- . .i. - .1 :* :> which ?.-.• Commissioner granted. At the 
hearing before the Commissioner, counsel for the defendants 
objected l > «»si roj n» ' |»'P I II»J piynmni -1 • *• j (• 1 support 
v -i ....-• proceeding. Defendants filed their objection 
thereto. : rv.* Dbjection was heard before the Honorable Stanton M 
Tay.v:r !" i: The District Court refused, to set 
aside the order .J: uie Commissioner. The defendants appealed. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 18, 1985 Blanca H. Charlesworth and the 
State of California submitted an URESA petitionf alleging that 
Blanca H. Charlesworth's former husband, Laurian P. Charlesworth, 
is the father of Joseph Charlesworth, born February 3, 1980; 
Patrick Charlesworth, born January 7, 1982; and Charlene 
Charlesworth, born March 18, 1983 and that an order of support 
needed to be established for the three children. 
On August 2, 1988, Laurian P. Charlesworth was served 
with a Petition for Support, and an Order to Show Cause why he 
should not be ordered to pay a reasonable sum of ongoing child 
support in accordance with the California URESA petition. At the 
October 18, 1988 hearing on the Order to Show Cause, respondent 
was represented by Pete N. Vlahos, Esq., and the State of 
California was represented by Utah Assistant Attorney General 
Karl G. Perry. The Order resulting from that hearing required 
the respondent to begin making payments of $76.00 a month per 
child for ongoing child support. 
Paragraph 3 of the Order reads, "That the Weber County 
Clerk's Office is directed to hold said funds until the 
Defendant, Blanca H. Charlesworth, allows the Plaintiff 
visitation with the minor children." The rest of the Order goes 
on to detail the visitation allowed and abates the support during 
the times of summer visitation. 
The Order of the Commissioner was objected to by Utah 
Assistant Attorney General Karl Perry. A hearing was held before 
4 
Ihe Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, on December ;•:, .988 or: r ie 
objection. During the hearing, attornev Karl Periy - < t) i e t • t i > 11 to 
I ho r omni i sti] niic!!' "u I i eatinent of \ isitation issues in a LIRESA 
context = : r.; •• ch:ld support V J S ;.he sole issue properly 
. i\hin *- i Court' ^lrisdictiuu. • .- aretMj, DIM, 
iivorce ^icL.ai., ,K place within the 
Courtis jurisdiction, ' i .:.1 o^ntoi .mi :M jurisdicr: on t • address 
visitatior ^ee iranscri \*> . nt.inued 
-^ see if visiLJixOJi couiu ::e worked ^ o \.w\, 12) 
1 ,
 M J r • — '^.ft " u'- .aam heara th^ Titter
 f 
and raled that • - * . j v. , |T, pq 
3 ) , The Notice • i Appeal was trier iiieu w Apr:, 27, I/JB9. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
That in a proceeding brought under the URESA provisions 
found in Utah Code Annotated § 77-31-1 1953, as amended, the only 
subject matter jurisdiction bestowed upon the District Court for 
the State of Utah is the determination of an obligation of child 
support and the enforcement of the same, and does not provide for 
im personum jurisdiction upon that parent which initiated the 
URESA action. 
That the District Court lacks jurisdiction under the 
URESA statutes of the State of Utah to adjudicate any domestic 
issue related to visitation, and that the withholding of the 
payment of support cannot be authorized as a means to enforce the 
rights of visitation of the noncustodial parent in that the right 
to support belongs to the child and should not be held hostage 
because of the conduct of one of the parents. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE ISSUES INVOLVING 
VISITATION IN A URESA ACTION 
The State of Utahf on beha if of the State of 
California, asks lor relief from that portion of the Distr^rrt. 
Court' s 0 rd<•> r i i"> 1 , iesworth' s receipt 
child support payments lor '.*-.-? three minor children on 
respondent's satisfactior ^r ^ •*- visitation right ,s 1 r Mic r^asr 'i 
that the iniiqinoiii i I brMiviajjo this ilourt had neither subject 
matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction over Blanca H. 
Charlesworth or IHM minor children to mi -jnd ir\it t* ^ i s i M M '»ii 
i i g h t G i in f 11J •> Hi'11',: ti\ i a s e . 
In Patterson v. Patterson, 581 1},2d 824 (Kan.App. 
1978) decree of divor < >nl>'rvri i Texasr vy>'her< ,• i II .-
vii .he lather t ,.c^  child support, granted custody t 
t:he mother and awarded the father rights of visitation, After 
the father moved • '-'is, t:i le mo ther i i i i tlated in URESA 
pet i nion
 f seeking ^ m or cement of the child support order i n the 
responding state of Kansas The Kansas trial court ordered the 
father to pay $25 i i i supp< :>::i : ! :
 f b\ it cond i tioned the 
( ursement upon ..- mother's fulfill Ing r he father's visitation 
rights, .'lie Kansas Court • f Appeals reversed tn-- riiii m n i r 
The appe i < tni: 
7 
The purpose of the URESA is to improve and 
extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement 
of duties of support. The goal sought by this 
legislation is to provide a prompt, expeditious 
way of enforcing the duty to support minor children 
without getting the parties involved in other 
complex, collateral issues. The act specifically 
declares that the remedies therein provided are in 
addition to an not in substitution for any other 
remedies. Nothing in the act allows the adjudication 
of child custody or visitation privileges 
or other matters commonly determined in domestic 
relations cases. We conclude that the trial court's 
order that payment of child support be withheld unless 
visitation rights are granted by the plaintiff was 
beyond its jurisdiction. The trial court did not have 
jurisdiction over the minor child for the reason 
that she was neither physically present in Seward 
County nor domiciled in Kansas and she had not 
been the subject of previous exercise by the 
court of its jurisdiction to determine her 
custody or care. 
Id. at 825 (citations omitted). 
In State ex rel. State of Washington v. Bozarth, 722 
P.2d 48 (Or. App. 1986), the court decided to join the "weight of 
authority from other jurisdictions that have considered the 
question" (see footnote 2 of the opinion for citations to other 
cases), in determining that "interference with visitation rights 
may not be raised in" a URESA petition. Id. at 49. The court 
explicitly adopted the rationale stated in State ex. rel. Hubbard 
v. Hubbard, 329 N.W. 2d 202 (Wis. 1983): 
The very purpose of the URESA requires 
that it be procedurally and substantively 
streamlined. Interstate enforcement of support 
obligations will be impaired if matters of 
custody, visitation, or a custodial parent's 
contempt are considered by the responding court. 
The introduction of such collateral issues will burden 
the efficiency of the URESA resolution of 
other family matters in a URESA proceeding may 
deter persons from invoking the URESA. 
8 
Bozarr;
 :; Accord, Vigil v. Vigil, 494 P.2d 609 (Colo. App. 
*?72'; County of Clearwater v. Petrash, 598 P.2d! <> . . 
"^  ' ~-
:
-
 :
-^<" ^g^c v . Madden, , - -\pp. 
:-7 . . -e •:ourt : i lower: its' holding in Bozarth, Supra and held 
that, 
The support obligation runs to the child, not 
to the mother.... the interstate enforcement 
of support obligations would be greatly 
impared if matters of custody, visitation and 
individual conduct were considered by the 
responding court in and URESA proceeding. 
While these precedents I inm ni IHM iur i, .srlict lunt" iinj mil 
. -.nrity ovpr thio U O U I L , v.:,e utan URESA crov;sions 
express clear legislative intent for c o u n ^ *. r interpret *:-e Utah 
provisions i n accordant - •,, ^ -u \ 
prov isi ons from,, other jurisdictions . The act states, 
This act shall be so interpreted and construed 
as to effectuate its general purposes to make 
uniform the law of those states wh i ch enact i t. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-3] -38. 
Utah's URESA provision explicitly prov. . •; 
part i.c:ipdf. .ion '"»! MI ••;.• • • * in an URESA proceeding does 
not confer jurisdiction over that petitioner in otner matters. 
Utah Code Annotated §77-31 31 reads, 
Participation in any proceedings under 
this act shall not confer upon any court 
jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto 
in any other proceeding. 
The scope of jurisdiction vested in the District Court in a URESA 
action is set forth in Utah ("ode An it it,i fori §7 7--<n«"! ^h i.h n ^ d s : 
How duties of support enforced. All duties 
of support, including arrearagesf and arrearages 
reimbursable to the state or a political sub-
division thereof are enforceable by action 
irrespective of the relationship between the 
obligor and the obligee. Actions authorized 
under this act include establishment of paternity, 
wage assignmentsf garnishment, liensf execution 
of liens, contempt proceedings and any other 
collection or enforcement procedure. 
When there is a lack of jurisdiction be it over 
the person or the subject matter then any judgment or order 
entered in a proceeding relying on such jurisdiction is void and 
of no effect. In Bowen v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602 (Utah 1952), the 
trial court entered a default judgment against the defendant in a 
quiet title suit. The defendant challenged the order of the 
trial court more than three years after it was entered, arguing 
that the plaintiffs' service of process upon him was 
insufficient. The Utah Supreme Court finding that service of 
process was insufficient determined that because the trial court 
never had jurisdiction over the defendant, the trial court's 
order was "void on its face for lack of jurisdiction of the 
court", and doctrines of laches and res judicata did not bar the 
defendant's challenge. Bowen at 606. In Pifer v. Pifer, 229 
S.E.2d 700 (North Carolina 1976), the parties were divorced in 
Florida. Mr. Pifer moved to North Carolina and in 1973 Mrs. 
Pifer filed a Petition for Support and affidavit in Florida under 
an URESA action. Judge Cline in the trial court in North 
Carolina ordered Mr. Pifer to pay current child support and also 
ordered that Mr. Pifer be allowed to visit the children in North 
Carolina and that such visitation be denied, all support payments 
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would immediately cease. Mr. Pifer ceased payments n December 
-)£ 1973 based upon 
ecite*- . :>: .-.. ULSLU^;. attorney filed ^ ir jn to 
strike that order terminating i : > payment m support and declare 
the same null anc > - the 
ground that 11 w^ ^iLnerai aiia:K ;n a previous order and 
that the order must remaan • -ff^ r^ <r^  I reversal or modified 
on appeal IJ|: c):i . < -, . . ina 
noted that " [I]: ;uun ;.^ :\ jurisdiction ovei tht subject 
matter, the judgment - -u considered uie u., -
whet> u . .i.i^ori in an URESA 
proceeding ;,. • enter ,^ .
 :i-. pertaining t > visitation privileges 
in Florida and North Carolina, The Court after rovi^w o!i" L„he 
URESA s»' '*! ntfj'i:? nj I IiM't.h Carolina con.cl.uded that: 
""""This duty of support is the only 
subject matter covered by URESA. Nothing 
in the act allows the adjudication of 
child custody or visitation privileges or 
other matters commonly determined in 
domestic relation cases. 
...it is our opinion that Judge Cline 
in the responding state of North Carolina 
had jurisdiction only to determine whether 
the defendant owed a duty of support to 
his children in the initiating state of 
Floridaf...Judge Cline had no jurisdiction 
whatsoever to condition the support 
payments upon certain visitation privileges... 
Consequently Judge Cline had no authority to 
permit a discontinuance of the support 
payments upon a finding by him of an alleged 
violation of the condition of visitation 
privileges. Thus the ex parte orders... 
permitting the defendant to cease support 
payments, are manifestly null and voidf and 
Judge Edens erred in refusing to hear the 
state's motion to set these orders aside." 
i± 
Pifer at 703. In Hoover v. Hoover, 246 S.E.2d 179 (South 
Carolina 1978) the issue again considered whether a court had 
jurisdiction under URESA to impose visitation conditions on the 
duty of support. The Supreme Court cited Pifer v. Pifer, Id. and 
ruled that a court of the responding state had no jurisdiction to 
adjudicate matters of visitation. See also People of the State 
of Illinois ex rel. Winger v. Young, 397 N.E.2d 253 (Illinois 
1979) held that under URESAf a responding court lacks authority 
to withhold child support payments until custodial parent makes 
child available for visitation. 
In Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 294 N.W.2d 249 
(Michigan 1980) the Court of Appeals considered the question of 
whether a Michigan court has in personam jurisdiction to modify a 
foreign divorce decree in an URESA proceeding. The Court stated 
that "[T]he act does not, of course, grant in personam 
jurisdiction over a nonresident party not otherwise subject to 
the power of Michigan courts." Fitzwater at 251. In Thompson v. 
Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (Kansas 1974) the defendant Kite and her 
children were residents of the state of Missouri. She had 
petitioned for an URESA action in Kansas where the plaintiff Mr. 
Thompson resided. Subsequent thereto the plaintiff in an 
independent action petitioned for injunctive relief from the 
payment of child support because he had been unable to exercise 
visitation. Mrs. Kite filed a motion to dismiss the petition for 
want of jurisdiction and the district court sustained her motion. 
The plaintiff appealed, claiming that Mrs. Kite having appeared 
12 
In the reciprocal proceeding in Kansas and having entered into an 
agreement : ->r * isitation had submittnd horsnit hn. r ni« 
H"" district court and that by failing to abide 
y tne agreement entered therein was amendable to : < 
jurisdiction L ' ' * n n l nmii i . in-1 * ' "• rids. 
Kansas affirmed tne ^augment or ~ne i .strict 
court dismissing t !*.e petition tor va-^ d jurisdiction *.e 
Court expounded u. • * •• ts 
purpose "was to enable parties to participate freely 
reciprocal proceedings without exposino + demselves ::o tne danger 
of submit* • jcjnding court i n 
other independent proceedings involving collateral matters." 
Thompson v. Kitef Id. at 330. 
BfM'vtuFP i inj (iisirirt Court 101 Vdfbex; County State of 
Utah had no in personam jurisdiction over Blanca H Charlesworth 
or the subject child nor subiect * • n * 
domes t n i oinn-.-M MI I i \ h,in i hi hi . ippun . . :nib >.Jr£b/' 
proceeding, the Recommended Order signed by the Commissions^ and 
its' affirmation by the D- • • * - ~> 
1 < - s.ii nt that on] y the ^^riLon dealing wicn cni^a support 
should stand. 
11. 
THE CONTINUOUS PAYMENT OF THE CHILD SUPPORT 
OBLIGATION SHOULD NOT BE MADE CONTINGENT 
UPON THE FREE EXERCISE OF VISITATION 
Regardless i whether there * <•: -jurisdiction und^* a 
URESA ac= adjudications as *-• issues 
1 3 
of visitation and child custody, the obligation to pay child 
support and the enforcement of the same is separate and apart 
from the enforcement of visitation interests. Utah Code 
Annotated §78-45-3 states that "Every man shall support his 
child;...". In Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981), two 
parties were divorced, and in their divorce decree, the trial 
court adopted by reference the parties' stipulation to deprive 
the husband of all parental rights and obligations. One month 
later, in an action to collect child support, the district court 
amended the divorce decree and ordered the father to pay child 
support. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court, stating that, 
There is no merit to the contention that 
the parents' stipulation effectively terminated 
the father's parental obligations. The right to 
support from the parents belongs to the minor 
children and is not subject to being bartered 
away, extinguished, estopped or in any way 
defeated by the agreement or conduct of the 
parents. 
Hills, at 517 (citations omitted). In Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 
P.2d 895 (Utah 1976) it was determined that a child's right to 
support is his own right, not his parent's. In French v. 
Johnson, 401 P.2d 315 (Utah 1965) the Utah Supreme Court 
determined that an award of child support in a decree cannot be 
avoided by the conduct or agreement of the parents See also 
Reeves v. Reeves, 556 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Utah 1976)("The children 
are unconditionally entitled to support from their parents; and 
the State is authorized by law and should be encouraged and aided 
as a matter of public policy to see that responsibility is borne 
14 
by them, both initially and in any necessary subsequent 
proceedings.")(emphasis added), in Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 
1303 (Utah 1980), this Court refused to impose a system whereby 
the noncustodial parents obligation to provide support would be 
conditioned upon the custodial parents compliance with the 
legally-prescribed minimum rights of visitation. A stay of 
execution was lifted on a child support judgement in Race v. 
Race, 740 P.2d 253 (Utah 1987) , where it was held that child 
support was an obligation imposed for the benefit of the 
children, not the divorcing spouse. 
By conditioning the dispersal of the minor children's 
support from their father upon Blanca H. Charlesworth's 
accommodation of respondent's right of visitation is contrary to 
the letter and spirit of the law and in fact becomes a weapon 
wielded against the child to force a child's visitation with a 
noncustodial parent. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-31-38 it should be 
the intent of this Court to construe and effectuate the general 
purposes of the Utah URESA provisions in uniformity with the laws 
of those states which have enacted URESA. The weight of 
authority in those states which have considered this question is 
that the only subject matter and purpose of URESA is to 
effectuate and enforce the payment of child support nation wide. 
No where in the URESA statutes for the state of Utah is there a 
grant of jurisdiction to hear matters relating to visitation. 
15 
There is no basis upon which the District Court can claim in 
personam jurisdiction over Blanca H. Charlesworth or the subject 
children, even though the divorce was in Utah. Therefore, 
because the District Court had no jurisdiction under the URESA 
proceedings to address visitation issuesf and even if the 
District Court had jurisdiction over respondent's visitation 
rights, the laws of Utah clearly forbids conditioning the payment 
of the child support obligations in any way. In particular there 
is no authority for the District Court in a URESA proceeding to 
terminate or withhold the payment of child support in the manner 
ordered by the District Court in this matter. This Court should 
declare the order of the District Court of March 1989 and the 
orders entered at the hearings on August 2, 1989 null and void 
for lack of jurisdiction of the court. 
DATED this /0^\jay of August, 1989. 
Attorney General 
16 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Appellants Brief to Pete N. Vlahos counsellor 
respondent at 2447 Kiesel Ave., Ogden, Utah 84401 on this /£#^day 
of August, 1989. 
ey General 
Attorney for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
18 
UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT 
77-31-1. Purposes. - The purposes of this act are to improve and extend by reciprocal legisla-
tion and enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto. 
77-31-2. Definitions. As used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires: 
(1) "State" includes any state, territory or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a sub-
stantially similar reciprocal law or procedure is in effect. 
(2) "Initiating state" means any state in which a proceeding pursuant to this or a substantial-
ly similar reciprocal law is commenced. 
(3) "Responding state" means any state in which any proceeding pursuant to the proceeding 
in the initiating state is or may be commenced. 
(4) "Court" means the district court of this state and when the context requires, means the 
court of any other state as defined in a substantially similar reciprocal law. 
(5) "Law" includes both common and statutory law. 
(6) "Duty of support" includes any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any 
court order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceed-
ing for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or otherwise. 
(7) "Obligor" means any person owing a duty of support. 
(8) "Obligee" means any person to whom a duty of support is owed and a state or political 
subdivision thereof. 
(9) "Governor" includes any person performing the functions of governor or the executive 
authority of any territory covered by the provisions of this act. 
(10) "Support order" means any judgment, decree or order of support, whether temporary 
or final, whether subject to modification, revocation or remission regardless of the kind of action 
in which it is entered. 
(11) "Rendering state" means any state in which a support order is originally entered. 
(12) "Registering court" means any district court of this state in which the support order of 
the rendering state is registered. 
(13) "Register" means to file in the registry of foreign support orders. 
(14) "Certification" shall be in accordance with the laws of the certifying state. 
(15) "Department" means the Utah state Department of social services. 
(16) "Title IV-D Agency" means the single and separate agency designated to enforce child 
support under an approved state plan pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and au-
thorized to reimburse costs and pay incentive under that title. 
77-31-3. - Remedies additional to those now existing. - The remedies herein provided are in 
addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies. 
77-31-4. - Extent of duties of support. - Duties of support arising under the law of this state 
when applicable under section 77-31-7 bind the obligor, present in this state, regardless of the 
presence or residence of the obligee. 
77-31-5. - Interstate rendition. - The governor of this state (1) may demand from the gover-
nor of any other state the surrender of any person found in such other state who is charged in 
this state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in this state and (2) 
may surrender on demand by the governor of any other state any person found in this state who 
is charged in such other state with the crime of failing to provide for the support of any person in 
such other state. The provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith shall apply 
to any such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding 
state at the time of the commission of the crime and although he had not fled therefrom. Neither 
the demand, the oath nor any proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need state or 
show that the person whose surrender is demanded has fled from justice, or at the time of the 
Commission of the crime was in the demanding or other state. 
77-31-6. - Conditions of interstate rendition. - (1) Before making the demand on the governor 
of any other state for the surrender of a person charged in this state with the crime of failing to 
provide for the support of any person, the governor of this state may require any county attorney 
of this state to satisfy him that at least sixty days prior thereto the obligee brought an action for 
the support under this act, or that the bringing of an action would be of no avail. 
iating state. 
77-31-15. - Cost and fees. - There shall be no filing fee or other costs taxable to the obligee, 
but a court of this state acting either as an initiating or responding state may in its discretion direct 
that any part of or all fees and costs incurred in this state, including without limitation by enumer-
ation, fees for filing, service of process, seizure of property, and stenographic service of both peti-
tioner and respondent or either, be paid by the obligor. 
77-31-16. - Jurisdiction by arrest. - When the court of this state, acting either as an initiating 
or responding state, has reason to believe that the respondent may flee the jurisdiction it may (1) 
as an initiating state request in its certificate that the court of the responding state obtain the body 
of the defendant by appropriate process if that be permissible under the law of the responding 
state; or (2) as a responding state, obtain the body of the respondent by appropriate process. 
77-31-17. - State information agency. - The department is hereby designated as the state in-
formation agency under this act, and it shall: 
(1) Compile a list of the courts and their addresses in this state having jurisdiction under this 
act and transmit the same to the state information agency of every other state which has adopted 
this or a substantially similar act: and 
(2) Maintain a register of such lists received from other states and transmit copies thereof as 
soon as possible after receipt to every court in this state having jurisdiction under this act. 
77-31-18. - Duty of court and county attorney of this state as responding state. - (1) After 
the court of this state acting as a responding state has received from the court of the initiating 
state the aforesaid copies, the clerk of the court shall docket the case and notify the county at-
torney of his action. 
(2) It shall be the duty of the county attorney diligently to prosecute the case. He shall take 
all action necessary in accordance with the laws of this state to give the court jurisdiction of the 
respondent or his property and shall request the court to set a time and place for a hearing. 
77-31-19. - Further duties of court and county attorney of this state in the responding state. 
(1) The county attorney shall, on his own initiative, use all means at his disposal to trace the re-
spondent or his property and if, due to inaccuracies of the petition or otherwise, the court cannot 
obtain jurisdiction, the county attorney shall inform the court of what he has done and request 
the court to continue the case pending receipt of more accurate information or an amended peti-
tion from the court in the initiating state. 
(2) If the respondent or his property is not found in the county and the county attorney dis-
covers by any means that the respondent or his property may be found in another county of this 
state or in another state, he shall so inform the court and thereupon the clerk of the court shall 
forward the documents received from the court in the initiating state to a court in the other coun-
ty or to a court in the other state or to the information agency or other proper official of the oth-
er state with a request that it forward the documents to the proper court. Thereupon both the 
court of the other county and any court of this state receiving the documents and the county at-
torney have the same powers and duties under this act as if the documents had been originally ad-
dressed to them. When the clerk of a court of this state retransmits documents to another court, 
he shall notify forthwith the court from which the documents came. 
(3) If the county attorney has no information as to the whereabouts of the obligor or his 
property, he shall so inform the initiating court. 
77-31-20. - Procedure. - The court shall conduct proceedings under this act in the manner pre-
scribed by law for an action for the enforcement of the type of duty of support claimed. 
77-31-21. - Petitioner absent from responding state - Continuance. - If the petitioner is absent 
from the responding state and the respondent presents evidence which constitutes a defense, the 
court shall continue the case for further hearing and the submission of evidence by both parties. 
77-31-22. - Evidence of husband and wife. - Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure 
of communications between husband and wife are inapplicable to proceedings under this act. Hus-
band and wife are competent witnesses and may be compelled to* testify to any relevant matter, in-
cluding marriage and parentage. 
a foreign support order, the obligee has the additional remedies provided in the 1 olio wing sections 
[77-31-33 to 77-31-37]. 
77-31-33. - Registration of foreign support orders. - The obligee may register the foreign sup-
port order in a court of this state in the manner, with the effect and for the purposes herein pro-
vided. 
77-31-34. - Registry of foreign support orders maintained by clerk. - The clerk of the court 
shall maintain a registry of foreign support orders in which he shall record foreign support orders. 
77-31-35. - Petition for registration of foreign support order. - The petition for registration 
shall be verified and shall set forth the amount remaining unpaid and a list of any other states in 
which the support order is registered and shall have attached to it a certified copy of the support 
with all modifications thereof. The foreign support order is registered upon the filing ot the peti-
tion subject only to subsequent order of confirmation. 
77-31-36. - Jurisdiction and procedure. - The procedure to obtain jurisdiction ot the person 
or property of the obligor shall be as provided in civil cases. The obligor may assert anv defense 
available to a defendant in an action on a foreign judgment. If the obligor defaults, the court shall 
enter an order confirming the registered support order and determining the amounts remaining un-
paid. If the obligor appears and a hearing is held, the court shall adjudicate the issues including the 
amounts remaining unpaid. 
77-31-37. - Effect of registration - Enforcement procedure. - The support orders as confirmed 
shall have the same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered in the court ot this state. 
The procedures for the enforcement thereof shall be as in civil cases, including the power to punish 
the respondent for contempt as in the case of other orders for payment of alimony, maintenance 
or support entered in this state. 
77-31-38. - Uniformity of interpretation. - This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it. 
77-31-39. - Citation - Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. - This act may be 
cited as the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. 
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